











Bradshaw, Michael J. and Waterworth, Alec (2018) Unconventional trade-offs? National oil 
companies, foreign investment and oil and gas development in Argentina and Brazil. Energy 
Policy, 122 . pp. 7-16. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.07.011 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/105902        
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
© 2018, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP url’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Unconventional trade-offs? National Oil Companies, foreign investment and oil and gas 
development in Argentina and Brazil
ABSTRACT
These are turbulent and uncertain times for the global oil and gas industry. This paper examines the 
industry’s emerging new political economy in terms of competition (or a trade-off) both between and 
within International Oil Companies (IOCs) for rival oil and gas prospects. A qualitative cross-case 
analysis of Argentinian shale and Brazilian deep-water finds that unconventional and deep-water 
projects are complementary rather than competing assets of an IOC’s portfolio. Further, despite the 
technical challenges IOCs face in developing these reserves, it is the non-technical risks and 
uncertainties that are more pressing for these companies and are the greater inhibitors to investment.
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INTRODUCTION
The global oil and gas industry is currently experiencing a period of significant uncertainty and 
disruption. The emergence of shale gas and tight oil in North America has been transformative to the 
industry and has played a major role in the recent decline in global oil and gas prices. At the same 
time, international oil companies (IOCs) are seeing the decline of access to ‘easy oil’ (i.e. 
conventional and cheap to produce), which is leading them to explore and potentially develop 
conventional reserves in extreme environments (e.g. Brazilian pre-salt, Arctic oil). In turn, lower oil 
and gas prices challenge the economic viability of such ventures, and all oil companies are operating 
under capital constraints. An estimated US$620 billion in projects have been cancelled or deferred 
through to 2020 (England, 2017).
In this new market environment, IOCs are increasingly cost conscious, and the days of investing in oil 
ventures regardless of energy prices (given their cyclical nature) are gone (Crooks and Adams, 2015, 
England and Slaughter, 2016). For reserve-holding states, the combination of the IOCs’ 
circumspection and the growing urgency for climate change mitigation raises the spectre of ‘stranded 
assets’. Oil-rich countries have seen their bargaining power with the IOCs eroded in an increasingly 
competitive market as rival oil and gas ventures, such as shale, have become viable. The rules of the 
game have changed, the net result of which is a new political economy that is altering the dynamic 
between the IOCs and the reserve-holdings states (Raszewski, 2018).
Under this scenario of constrained capital and a ‘lower for longer’ oil price, this paper addresses the 
competition for capital that may or may not exist between two prospective developments (and, more 
broadly, between deep-water offshore and onshore tight oil and shale gas): Brazilian deep-water ‘pre-
salt’ resources (which reside offshore under a thick layer of salt); and shale resources in Argentina, 
focussed in the Vaca Muerta (Dead Cow) formation. The need for capital investment is clear in both 
cases. In 2010, soon after the pre-salt discovery, Brazil’s national development bank (BNDES) 
estimated that investments of between US$150 billion and US$430 billion would be required in the 
Brazilian oil sector before 2027 (Almeida and Accurso, 2013). Industry experts believe between 
US$140 billion and US$200 billion will be required to realise the large-scale development of the Vaca 
Muerta (The Economist, 2014). This paper examines the interrelationships between the technical and 
non-technical characteristics of these resources with regards to what might deter or encourage foreign 
investment. The analysis also offers insight into the differences between the two countries’ policies 
towards resource governance.
A qualitative cross-case analysis examines these sectors across several dimensions and draws on 
semi-structured interviews conducted in Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro over two weeks 
in November 2016. A semi-structured format for the interviews was adopted as this provided a 
coherence to the discussions, whilst also offering the interview subject flexibility in their response and 
supports and the gathering of detailed contextual information. Interviewees were selected through 
‘non-probability sampling’, whereby subjects are “deliberately selected to reflect particular features 
of, or groups within, the sampled population” (Ritchie et al., 2003), and were identified primarily 
through documentary research. Four groups of actors were targeted: governmental actors, oil 
companies (IOCs, national oil companies (NOCs) and smaller national/regional operators), industry 
bodies and academic experts. Documentary analysis provided more detail around the areas of 
discussion. Once the interviews were transcribed, template analysis was used as the primary method 
of organising the data, which involves iteratively identifying a set of emergent ‘themes’ in the data, 
from which a narrative can be formed. It is noted for its effectiveness in examining the “perspectives 
of different groups within an organisational context” (King, 2004). 
A total of sixteen interviews were conducted. An overview of the organisations at which these were 
held is presented in the table below.  A final follow-up interview was conducted in the UK in January 
2017 with the Deepwater Portfolio Manager of ‘Operator-2 (anonymised hereafter as ‘Interviewee-
B’).  All interviewees and their organisations have been anonymised where this was requested.
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Table 1: Overview of interview subjects
The paper explores three research questions:
1. What are the supporting and inhibiting mechanisms (both technical and non-technical) to 
foreign investment by the IOCs?
2. To what extent does competition for investment exist between conventional and 
unconventional resources in the portfolios of IOCs?
3. What are the policy lessons that can be gleaned from the case study countries’ approaches to 
resource management, including the role of NOCs in national energy strategy?
LITERATURE REVIEW
This review draws on two areas of academic research to provide the necessary context ahead of the 
paper’s analysis: (i) the challenge for resource holding states, including avoidance of the resource 
curse, establishment of NOCs and development local content requirements; and (ii) the recent changes 
in the global energy system and the challenges these pose for IOCs with regards to strategy and 
international business.
The resource curse, local content and NOCs
It is paradoxical, but nevertheless undeniable, that, on average, resource-rich nations perform worse in 
terms of economic progress than resource-poor nations (Auty, 2001, Rosser, 2006). This effect is 
known as the ‘resource-curse’ (Auty, 1993), and typically refers to fossil fuel and mineral resources, 
with a more specific ‘oil curse’ attributed to countries heavily reliant on the production of oil (Ross, 
2012). The poorer economic performance of oil-rich nations is surprising, given the large windfall 
gains that can be reaped from the extraction of oil. However, there are many examples of countries 
that have suffered from the resource curse, such as the Netherlands (which gave rise to the term 
'Dutch Disease'; Corden, 1984), Venezuela (Hammond, 2011) and Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2013). The curse is not so much a product of an abundance of resources but rather the 
dependence on them (Badeeb et al., 2017).
Argentina Brazil
Government Ministry of Energy and Mining 
(MEyM)
National Petroleum Agency (ANP); 
Ministry of Mining and Energy 
(MME)




This includes two IOCs, one NOC and two national/regional operators.
Industry Bodies Argentinian Institute of Oil & Gas 
(IAPG); Argentinian Group of 
Suppliers for the Oil and Gas 
Industry (GAPP)
Brazilian Institute of Petroleum (IBP)
Academic Experts Rio  de  Janeiro  State  University 
(UERJ);  University  of  São  Paulo 
(USP); Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ)
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There is compelling evidence that the resource curse can be attributed to the failure of state leaders to 
effectively manage a resource abundance through appropriate policies and governing institutions 
(Khanna, 2017). Each country possesses a unique institutional context (North, 2009); institutions 
being the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1992) that govern the interactions between 
individuals and groups. There is a strong argument in the literature that it is the quality of institutions 
that makes the difference when it comes to achieving economic progress through the exploitation of 
natural resources. Countries with strong institutions before and during the development of the 
resource - political stability, low corruption and political risk, effective bureaucracy, strong rule of law 
- tend to benefit from their resource abundance; whilst those with weak institutions are more likely to 
submit to the curse (Mehlum et al., 2006, Robinson et al., 2006).
The resource curse is not inevitable, and there are several cases of oil-rich nations that have avoided 
it. Most prominent of these is Norway, with its strong institutional framework and effective public 
policy and resource management approach regarded as key features of its success (Badeeb et al., 
2017). Norway, and other resource-rich nations, have addressed the threat of the resource curse 
though policies and strategies that are focused on extending the benefits of resource extraction to 
other sectors of the economy. Pursuing ‘local content’ is a common policy response in such situations. 
Local content can refer to the sourcing of domestically produced materials, personnel, goods and 
services, and can be enforced/encouraged through contractual requirements, regulation, taxation, or 
incentives (such as tax breaks). It emerged in the North Sea development in the 1970s, where it was 
successful in creating opportunities for employment, sectoral growth and technology transfer. 
However, historical cases - particularly those in the developing world - illustrate several barriers to 
the effectiveness of local content policies, such as the availability of sufficient pools of competitive 
local suppliers and qualified personnel, and the technology level of the domestic industry. Further, and 
related to the maturity of the local supply sector, local content can raise costs, impair quality and 
create delays in projects (Warner, 2017).
Oil-rich nations will often further increase state participation through the establishment of an NOC. 
There are over one hundred NOCs globally, and they are found in almost all oil exporting and many 
oil importing developing countries (McPherson, 2003). They control an estimated 90 per cent of 
global oil reserves, 75 per cent of global production, and an estimated 60 per cent of the world’s 
undiscovered resources are in countries in which NOCs operate with privileged access (World Energy 
Council, 2013).
It is commonplace for NOCs to be used to address a broad agenda of economic, social and political 
objectives beyond those of the sector. In fact, the ways in which NOCs are “tied to the national 
purpose” (Khan, 1987: 188) is a distinguishing characteristic in comparison with private enterprises in 
the industry. In comparison to their privately-owned counterparts, NOCs have been observed to 
exhibit several shortcomings. Some of these stem from their remit of both commercial and non-
commercial objectives, which Stevens (2003) found can often be in conflict. For example, NOCs have 
been observed to prioritise employment policies over considerations of profitability (Gochenour, 
1992), both over-employing and overpaying their personnel (Eller et al. , 2011). They have also been 
known to focus on immediate financial gains rather than long-term profitability (Hartley and Medlock, 
2008); whereas private enterprises have historically had to strive for efficiency and productivity, often 
through investment in technology and competence building. Shielded from competition, NOCs, have 
tended to focus on managing the asset base that was handed to them, leading them to be less efficient 
and lacking in technological prowess, managerial competencies and technical expertise (Tordo et al. , 
2011).
Nevertheless, there are many examples, particularly in the ‘developed world’, where national oil and 
gas industries have addressed both sectoral development and national development through fiscal, 
regulatory and contractual frameworks without utilising an NOC to drive non-commercial objectives. 
Engen (2009) describes how Norway, following the discovery of significant offshore oil reserves in 
the 1960s, went on to both establish itself as a force in the global oil and gas market and maximise the 
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benefit from the development of these reserves for the broader Norwegian society. However, 
‘developing economies’ often lack the institutional strength required to balance sectoral and national 
growth, leading them to rely on the NOC as a tool for policymaking. As such, the role of NOCs in 
developing world contexts is often linked to the resource curse.
Changes in the global energy system and challenges for IOCs
Of course, the creation and management of NOCs is only part of the picture in describing the 
commercial exploitation of oil resources. Where countries are amenable to their participation, IOCs 
pursue opportunities for oil production, either in partnership with the NOC or independently. In some 
countries, the participation of the NOC is mandatory. Access is granted to IOCs in exchange for a 
variety of payments including: bonuses, royalties, taxes and/or a share of the production. The latter is 
often formalised with a Production-Sharing Agreement that might also include local content 
requirements. This is more common in developing countries, where an IOC can address domestic 
shortcomings with regards to knowledge, skills, technological competence and financial capital. It is 
also often hoped that the presence of IOCs in the national oil sector will result in the transfer of 
expertise and technological prowess to domestic companies through partnerships, again, often as a 
result of local content agreements.
It is important to note the grey area that exists between IOCs and NOCs: some IOCs, such as BP and 
Total, were previously NOCs, prior to privatisation (in the UK and France, respectively); and NOCs 
such as Norway’s Statoil (now Equinor) and Brazil’s Petrobras, whilst partially-privatised, still 
operate in ways that support the interests of their national governments.
As noted above, NOCs now dominate both global oil production and global reserve holdings (to an 
increasing degree), whereas forty years ago IOCs controlled 85% of global reserves. Consequently, 
IOCs are being driven to consider oil prospects that in the past would have been deemed too risky, 
either technically or politically. For example, Chevron, Total and Shell continue to invest in Venezuela 
despite high levels of political unrest and uncertainty. Strategically, IOCs seek to mitigate political 
risks and uncertainties through the diversification of projects globally. However, this does not detract 
from how significant institutional contexts are to an IOC’s performance in those projects (Florêncio, 
2016). These same IOCs invest elsewhere in oil prospects that present unforeseen technical challenges 
(such as ‘ultra-deep water’ oil) or stray from their long-established expertise and business practices 
(such as shale oil and gas). And despite the pursuit of new oil ventures, these companies are 
struggling to replace their reserve holdings of late. For example, ExxonMobil - the world’s largest oil 
company - has failed to replace its output for the last two years running (67% in 2015; 65% in 2016), 
after more than twenty years of consistently replacing at least 100% of production (Davis, 2017a).
The recent years of turbulence in the oil industry have challenged the power of the leading IOCs, the 
effectiveness of their long-held business model, and their competitive advantage, leaving their fate 
uncertain (Stevens, 2016). This section of the paper briefly discusses the key shifts in the industry and 
the ways in which these present challenges for the IOCs.
Having remained above US$100/bbl (per barrel) for over three years, the Brent Crude oil price 
crashed in mid-2014, halving within a matter of months. The crash was caused by a multitude of 
factors, including falling demand from emerging economies (e.g. China, Russia and India), Saudi 
Arabia’s strategic stabilisation of production despite falling prices, and the boom of shale oil and gas 
production in the United States (which will be discussed subsequently). By January 2016, it reached a 
low of US$30/bbl. A modest recovery in 2017-18 has led the price back to above US$60/bbl 
(averaging US$54/bbl in 2017; Statistica, 2018) but fluctuations in the price throughout this period 
cast a large shadow of uncertainty over the industry. These short-term cyclical adjustments are not 
offering much reassurance to the IOCs as they continue to prepare for a lower for longer future by 
reducing debt, cutting capital expenditure and improving project returns (Malek, 2018). A lower oil 
price ultimately squeezes margins at a time when the IOCs are increasingly losing access to ‘easy 
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oil’ (now dominated by NOCs) and thus moving towards more technically-challenging and higher-
cost prospects.
In the past, IOCs could be assured that a low oil price would recover as part of a cycle of lower prices 
followed by higher prices. However, demand is slowing in a post-Paris Agreement world, with 
countries imposing controls on emissions and fossil fuel consumption, removing subsidies on oil 
production, raising sales taxes on oil products, and targeting the elimination of petrol and diesel cars. 
As such, the low oil price may not produce the sort of demand response seen in the past (Stevens, 
2016). It is broadly accepted that the oil price fluctuations of the last several years are not part of the 
cyclical pattern of old but rather that it signals a deeper long-run structural transformation in oil 
demand. With slowing demand, and that demand increasingly being met by low-cost supply from 
NOC-led markets and unconventional resources, a price recovery of the magnitude observed in the 
past is unlikely. Industry experts assert that a new equilibrium price will be found - significantly under 
the US$100/bbl price of the early part of this decade - and IOCs are accordingly preparing for a 
‘lower for longer’ future, with Shell even bracing itself for a ‘lower forever’ future and applying the 
mantra ‘fit for the forties’ (Davis, 2017b). Slowing demand also means that there is less room in the 
market for the high-cost, long-term projects that have dominated the IOCs’ investment portfolios in 
the past (Maher and Mikulska, 2016).
As noted above, the shale revolution has played a significant role in lowering the oil price. However, 
the impact of shale - and more broadly unconventional oil and gas - on the competitiveness of IOCs 
extends far beyond this. The shale revolution occurred swiftly due to the unique mineral ownership 
rights of the United States, leading the US to a 46-year high of oil production in 2017 (EIA, 2017). Its 
development is notable for being driven by independent oil companies, rather than the IOCs that are 
now playing catch-up. This was possible due to the different profile of unconventionals compared to 
conventional oil and gas (in addition to the availability of lending to operators under favourable 
conditions). Shale development calls for a much shorter investment cycle, with relatively low upfront 
costs and short lead and payback times. Unconventional production is also much quicker to come 
online and peaks much sooner. Exploration activities are minimal, given that the location and broad 
characteristics of the main ‘plays’ are well known. The sector is much more agile - a trait that strongly 
reflects the nature of drilling unconventional wells - and can respond sooner to changes in price. This 
latter point is one of the leading arguments for a ‘lower for longer’ scenario, given that any increase in 
price can be met swiftly by an increase in shale production, and vice-versa, thereby leading to fewer, 
shorter and smaller price swings (Krane and Agerton, 2015).
These differences are at the heart of the erosion of the IOCs’ competitive advantage and the challenge 
to their long-held business model. For decades, competitive advantage has stemmed from the IOCs’ 
investment muscle, world-leading technologies and wealth of experience. In contrast, unconventional 
projects require comparatively modest investment, are relatively ‘low-tech’, and do not require the 
project management skills that conventional oil and gas projects do. In fact, unconventional projects 
require a very different approach to project management, as will be illustrated through the case studies 
in this paper. Any IOC considering venturing into unconventional plays will need to balance this with 
finding business model solutions to address capital constraints and a ‘lower for longer’ future, tackling 
the technical challenges of extreme oil frontiers, and diversifying their business models (e.g. into 
renewables) with slowing oil demand.
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES OF BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
Oil and gas prospects present a lot of technical challenges and risks, and the two case studies 
presented here are no different. However, the significance of technical challenges in the industry can 
lead the significance of non-technical risks to be diluted in analytical studies (Florêncio, 2016). As an 
antidote, this analysis focuses on the non-technical risks posed by the development of Brazilian deep-
water and Argentinian shale. However, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the resource 
base and technical challenges in relation to the two cases. 
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Quantity and characterisation of the resources
In 2007, Petrobras discovered huge offshore oil resources in Brazilian seas (termed the ‘pre-salt’), 
estimated to hold over 50 billion barrels of oil. The oil resides beneath a thick layer of salt in a deep-
water marine environment. Similar reservoirs, although rare, do exist elsewhere in the world and are 
usually found in shallow, warm seas. Sub-salt exploration and production presents a new 
technological paradigm in many technical disciplines and the Brazilian pre-salt is, to date, the only 
sub-salt oil and gas resource to have been explored and developed. Pre-salt production oil now 
exceeds over 1.4 million barrels per day and accounts for fifty per cent of Petrobras’ oil production  
(GlobalData, 2018). The task for oil companies comes not in meeting the technical challenges posed 
by sub-salt oil and gas, but rather meeting them in a commercially-viable manner that also meets the 
demands of the state.
Argentina is thought to have the third largest shale gas reserves in the world (behind the US and 
China), most of which are found in the Vaca Muerta formation within the Neuquén province, which 
covers a territory the size of Belgium. The Vaca Muerta is estimated to hold 16.2 billion barrels of 
technically recoverable shale oil resources and 308 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of risked, technically 
recoverable shale gas. Argentina’s total technically recoverable shale resources are estimated at 27 
billion barrels of shale oil and 802 Tcf of risked shale gas (EIA, 2013). The thick shale strata contain 
high quality, organic-rich shales, confined under high pressure. To date, productivity of wells in the 
Vaca Muerta has been in line with the top shale operations in the US (Wilson, 2016). Shale production 
in the Vaca Muerta is expected to grow by one-third in 2018 over 2017 levels, according to Wood 
Mackenzie (2017).
National oil companies: historical contexts and expertise bases
Petrobras was established in 1953. Whereas most global NOCs are created to appropriate rents from 
oil, this was not the case with Petrobras (Rocha, 2012). In the early 1950s, there was very little in 
terms of proven oil reserves in Brazil. From its earliest beginnings, Petrobras adopted an investment 
strategy focussed on technological development and competence building, which succeeded in 
creating one of the country’s most important sectors from the ground up. Oil operators are typically 
characterised as having ‘low R&D intensity’ (Perrons, 2014). High levels of R&D investment can be 
observed in Petrobras since the discovery of deep-water oil resources in the mid-1980s, which led the 
company to venture into increasing depths in the subsequent decades (Silvestre and Dalcol, 2009). To 
this day, the company continues to lead and control the technological value chain in the Brazilian 
offshore.
Petrobras was privatised in 1997 but remains majority-owned by the Brazilian government. It is a 
vital contributor to the national economy, accounting for 13 per cent of total GDP in 2015 (Petrobras, 
2016). It is part of Brazil’s national identity and is entrenched in the country’s political landscape. 
This has been all too evident lately as a result of the corruption scandal emerging from Operation 
Lava Jata in 2014, which implicated several of the country’s highest government officials in 
corruption and money laundering allegations involving the misappropriation of billions of dollars via 
Petrobras. The position of Petrobras has been undermined further by the recent decline of the oil 
price, which calls into question the economic viability of the existing pre-salt reserves and 
demonstrates the conditional nature of such difficult-to-develop resources. 
In keeping with the global industry, Petrobras has scaled back its investment strategy, reducing its 
five-year investment plan (2015-19) by twenty five per cent from the original forecast (Pearson, 
2016). The company is also undergoing an assets sales programme that will oversee divestments of 
US$21 billion in 2018-22 (Costa and Bautzer, 2016).
The corruption scandal and the country’s broader economic downturn have made Brazil an 
unattractive prospect for foreign investment at present. Management consultancy A.T. Kearney 
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identified such considerations as explanatory factors for a 12 per cent drop in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows to Brazil between 2014 and 2015 (Rapoza, 2016). However, an interviewee 
at one IOC currently operating in Brazilian deep-water stated that Petrobras remains an attractive 
partner because of its technical expertise and the two companies’ long-held relationship. Interviewees 
from Brazil’s National Petroleum Agency (ANP) similarly stated that Petrobras will continue to be a 
likely and desirable partner due to its expertise, technology base and strong R&D performance.
As with Petrobras, YPF is majority-owned by the national government. However, it is important to 
note that over the last twenty-five years the company’s ownership has gone from nationalised, to 
privatised, to renationalised. In 1993, YPF was privatised as part of a national privatisation 
programme to alleviate national external debt, and natural resources, such as oil, were utilised as an 
‘economic resource’, rather than a ‘sovereign resource’ (McGowan, 2011). This culminated in 
Spanish oil company Repsol acquiring a 98 per cent share of the company holdings in April 1999. 
Overall, privatisation was successful in significantly increasing YPF’s oil production and capital 
expenditure.
The start of YPF’s return to nationalisation can be traced to the period between 2008 and 2011, when 
an increasing share of it was incrementally acquired by the Argentine organisation Grupo Peterson, 
although Repsol remained the majority shareholder. During these years, YPF’s domestic production 
declined significantly, to a point where Total S.A. surpassed it as the leading oil producer in the 
country, and Argentina became a net importer of energy for the first time in almost twenty years. 
Repsol attributed YPF’s stagnation to the export and pricing controls imposed by the state (Carter, 
2013). The government in turn argued that Repsol was underinvesting in YPF and increasing the 
dividends sent abroad; claims that Moreno et al. (2013) ably surmise were largely baseless. This 
would come to form the platform for the renationalisation of YPF in April 2012, which should be 
understood in consideration of several political, economic and market factors at the time. It was part 
of a nationalist movement under President Cristina Fernández, which included pledges to regain 
control of the Falklands Islands (Islas Malvinas), increase non-tariff barriers to trade, nationalise other 
Argentinian companies (including airline Aerolíneas Argentinas), and pursue ‘energy sovereignty’. 
For the oil and gas industry, this meant greater controls and interventionism from the government, 
whereas prior to this, Argentina was one of only five countries in the world that could be considered 
to have a truly open market in which foreign and local companies competed on an even playing field 
(Moreno et al. , 2013). Hailed as a patriotic victory, YPF’s renationalisation distracted from a number 
of high profile corruption scandals and the country’s negative economic conditions at the time. 
Following the discovery by Repsol-YPF of vast shale deposits in the Vaca Muerta formation in 2010, 
there was clearly also great appeal in controlling these reserves and driving their development in the 
hope of alleviating the financial burden of costly natural gas imports.
The expropriation of YPF caused significant reputational damage and drew attention to the high levels 
of political risk in Argentina at the time. This is now being addressed under the stewardship of 
President Mauricio Macri, inaugurated in December 2015 after twelve years of populist governance. 
Macri is a free-market proponent and was outspokenly opposed to the renationalisation of YPF. He 
has introduced several economic reforms to encourage foreign investment and return the industry to 
an open market, which will be discussed later. This has significantly changed the relationship between 
the government and YPF, as was discussed with Marcos Porteau, Secretary of Hydrocarbon Resources 
at MEyM: “I think the previous government had more of a view of YPF being a tool for policy, and 
that is no longer the case. […] We see YPF as a private company with the government as a 
shareholder that should work under the framework of a private company” (Marcos Porteau, MEyM). 
This sentiment was reiterated by two business strategists at YPF. However, Argentina remains a 
source of political risk and uncertainty for investors. The country has a turbulent history of economic 
crises, the latest of which in mid-2018 brought about soaring inflation and saw the value of the 
Argentine peso against the US dollar reach a record low (Otaola and Bianchi, 2018).
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As with Petrobras, YPF is currently operating under a significant budget cut. The company is facing 
up to this challenge, as well as its limitations with regards to expertise and technology pertinent to 
shale gas development, through partnerships with IOCs that are similarly working within capital 
constraints.
Contrasting business models and similar goals
The oil companies’ position of constrained capital is coupled with high costs in Argentina. The cost 
per well in the Neuquén is 2-3 times that of a similar well in the US (Solbrække and Triana, 2016). 
This can be attributed to logistical challenges (including the need for all equipment and resources to 
be delivered by road), labour conditions and import taxation on equipment. Interviewees from several 
operators were asked about the leading challenges they face and a universal response was cost. This is 
being met by a change in business model, described as completely different from that employed in 
conventional oil and gas. One interviewee from an IOC described the introduction of a “new 
mindset”: one focussed on cost reduction and increased flexibility and responsiveness. According to 
another, this focus on costs does not come naturally to many IOCs as it is often not a priority in 
traditionally high-profit offshore markets. Further, a lean approach such as this is difficult for a huge, 
hierarchically-structured IOC to adapt to. The heterogeneous nature of unconventional reservoirs and 
the need for many more wells than required in a conventional project mean that scale efficiencies are 
harder to achieve: “each well is a reservoir within itself” (Interviewee-A, Operator-1). This calls for a 
more precise, flexible and responsive approach to exploration and production. One interviewee 
described the “complete disaster” some European and US firms have had in trying to impose their 
conventional business model on small unconventional firms they acquired.
Whilst this business model differs from that of conventional resources, many of the IOCs operating in 
Argentinian shale have learnt a lot of valuable lessons from US shale that can be transferred. A 
respondent from one IOC said that the company aims to be “as nimble as an independent” whilst 
utilising the company’s wealth of expertise. They are, in fact, utilising the same drilling and 
completion teams as were active in the US, with drilling being monitored in Houston and US 
benchmarks used to measure success in Argentine operations.
A further part of this business model is cooperation across operators, described by one interviewee as 
“coopetition” (i.e. cooperative competition): a notion consistent across all operators interviewed. This 
includes not only the sharing of data and information to improve recovery, reduce costs and find the 
most prospective areas (or ‘sweet spots’), but also the sharing of equipment (e.g. rigs are co-owned by 
several operators and their design is standardised to a mutually-agreed specification).
The pre-salt, on the other hand, is being pursued through a tried and tested conventional offshore 
business model. Operators are similarly preparing for a ‘lower for longer’ price scenario by 
addressing the need to reduce costs. However, in this case, this is focussed on technological 
innovation to bring large-scale cost reductions. Shell, for example, is leading the development of a 
subsea factory concept, which would see the entire production process moved to the seabed and, once 
finalised, is expected to deliver drastic cost savings and productivity gains. This need for 
breakthrough technologies in “a new reality” of ‘lower for longer’ was similarly expressed by Antonio 
Guimarães of the Brazilian petroleum industry association IBP. For Shell’s Chief Executive, Ben van 
Beurden, the Brazilian deep-water is “where the lowest break-even prices can be realised” (Leahy, 
2016) - even as low as $US40/bbl (Webb and Alper, 2017) - and technological innovation is crucial 
for this.
As with Argentinian shale, cooperation amongst oil companies is a mainstay of this business model. 
Offshore projects, being much more capital intensive, require partners and it is natural that these 
partners collaborate in delivering such projects. One interviewee from an IOC that will soon enter the 
pre-salt described the mutual benefit the company and its partners (including Petrobras) were enjoying 
from sharing expertise and international experience, including reduced cost and increased productivity 
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and reliability. Similarly, operators are working with their first-tier suppliers (companies that offer 
products and/or services directly to them) in the pursuit of technology solutions for cost reduction. 
One first-tier supplier in subsea technologies described a series of innovations that had resulted in 
reductions in cost of between thirty and fifty per cent.
Several IOCs are active in both Argentinian shale and Brazilian deep-water. Shell, BP and 
ExxonMobil are all examples of such and are each pursuing operatorship in Brazil now that 
restrictions against this have been lifted (as discussed below). They have each demonstrated an 
impressive discipline over capital investment and cost management in light of changing market 
dynamics and a lower oil price. BP operate under a mantra of ‘value over volume’, stating that the 
market will “reward businesses that can remain highly competitive at these prices” (BP, 2017). As of 
2016, the company had reduced capital spend by 35% from peak levels in 2013, and controllable cash 
costs had fallen by US$7 billion reduction since 2014 (BP, 2017). Similarly, ExxonMobil recently 
reported a reduction of US$11 billion in operating costs since 2013 (ExxonMobil, 2018).
Shell emphasise a ‘lower forever’ mindset, focussed on lowering capital expenditure, reducing debt 
and improving project returns. A 2016-18 divestment programme of US$30 billion is in place and 
being adhered to, with further divestments of at least US$5 billion planned over the period 2019-20 
(Shell, 2018a). Operating costs have fallen by more than 20% since 2014 (Shell, 2017). Capital 
efficiency has improved significantly, with a reported 5.8% return on average capital employed in 
2017 against 3% and 1.9% in 2016 and 2015 respectively (Shell, 2018a). In 2017, capital expenditure 
was at less than 60% of 2014 levels (Shell, 2017). Over the same period, the company’s deepwater 
operations delivered well cost reductions of 50%, well duration reductions of 35%, and unit 
development cost reductions of 48% (Shell, 2018b). Shell has also reshaped its portfolio in recent 
years, so as to be more resilient to lower prices and future price shocks, which includes increasing its 
investment in leading shale prospects, such as the Vaca Muerta.
Competition for capital exists within Shell (and other IOCs) between conventional and 
unconventional resources: there is currently more investment being made into conventional offshore, 
whereas the company’s shale operations must mature to make them more attractive for investment. 
However, this competition occurs - as an interviewee from one  IOC explained - “in a way that means 
they are complementary as well” (Interviewee-B, Operator-2). Whilst pre-salt requires much higher 
investment, is inflexible and reaps long-term gains, shale is very flexible, allowing operators to 
advance at their own pace, and offers returns within months, rather than years. Companies require 
high quantities of oil reserves in their portfolios for the foreseeable future and Brazilian deep-water 
satisfies this (the interviewee noted the limited opportunities globally for accessible oil for IOCs). It 
also builds upon the company’s established competencies. Shale, however, whilst competing for 
capital, satisfies a different aspect of the portfolio and its flexibility is particularly attractive in a 
volatile price environment. Activity can be wound down under a low price and ramped up following a 
price recovery within a matter of months (which would take years in the conventional offshore). As 
such, it offers a level of resilience to operators towards potential future shocks.
“They both make sense, both for economic reasons but also for portfolio reasons. 
[Operator-2] is a company that needs a mixture of things in its portfolio and in a down cycle 
it is handy to have short cycle projects that you can shut down and allow the company's 
capital programme to decline. Equally, in the up times, it is great that you have production 
that is on-stream and when the oil price goes up the cash that is coming in goes up 
immediately, which is what deep-water does” (Interviewee-B, Operator-2).
Shell’s Upstream International Director, Andrew Brown, reiterated these sentiments in early 2018, 
stating that “[shale] gives us a balance in our portfolio where you can ramp investment up and down, 
[…] unlike deepwater which is quite chunky. They sit nicely together in a portfolio” (Bousso and 
Zhdannikov, 2018).  Shell’s CEO, Ben van Beurden, has similarly stated that “we need both 
characteristics in our portfolio. […] They complement each other” (Triepke, 2017).
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Analysis from the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions illustrates how a balanced portfolio can strike 
an equilibrium between production, investment and returns: the low initial capital investment but high 
repeat capital of shale is balanced by the high initial capital but low repeat capital of deepwater; the 
high initial volumes but high decline rates of shale are balanced by the low/medium initial volumes 
but low decline rates of deepwater; and the high production cost variability of shale is balanced by the 
relatively stable production costs of deepwater (Deloitte, 2018).  The authors identify a trend of IOCs 
remaining committed to long-cycle resources, such as deepwater, whilst suggesting the future will 
also see many utilise short-cycle shale resources to bolster their diversified portfolios and drive 
overall production ("the key missing factor until now"; Deloitte, 2018).
There is one further complementarity between these resources. There are opportunities for the 
competencies and technologies developed in the pre-salt to also benefit an oil company’s shale 
operations, and vice-versa. For example, reservoir modelling is a challenge to both resource types and 
the development of 3D and 4D seismic technologies will prove important to the economic viability of 
both. Similarly, several interviewees suggested that the predictive methodology, cost efficient 
approach and lessons from enhanced recovery stemming from shale operations would benefit their 
conventional oil and gas operations.
Comparing policy frameworks
The political and institutional risks of investing in Latin America are well known.  Here, we focus on 
how these risks manifest themselves in the dynamic between reserve holding states and foreign 
investors in the industry, and the impact this may have on future investment levels in the respective 
case study countries’ oil and gas sectors given the current turbulence in the industry.
Brazil has a history of protectionism in its core industries, particularly during two periods from 1956 
to 1961 and again from the late 1960s to mid-1970s (known as ‘the Brazilian Miracle’). Both periods 
saw exceptional national growth driven by governmental interventions that controlled imports, 
encouraged foreign direct investment, established national champions in key industries (including 
Petrobras), founded a national development bank (BNDES) and promoted selected sectors (Baer and 
Paiva, 1997). However, a protectionist approach to governance has its drawbacks, and these periods 
are also notable for the huge levels of foreign debt that were accrued and the sustained hyperinflation 
endured. Within industry, isolated from international competition, sectors were inefficient and lacked 
innovative capacity (Roett, 1997). These shortcomings remain evident in Brazil’s oil and gas industry 
today. Growth stagnated in the 1980s and gave rise to the 'New Economic Model’, which moved away 
from industrial protectionism and would eventually lead to the privatisation of Petrobras in 1997.
The liberal market policies of the late 1990s and early 2000s attracted a lot of investment from IOCs, 
with Brazil only one of three countries at the time (along with the US and Canada) to offer pure 
concession contracts where projects could be entirely foreign and private-owned. However, the pre-
salt discovery a decade later proved the impetus for a renewed faith in protectionism. A series of 
regulatory reforms were introduced, aimed at increasing governmental control of the industry, and 
particularly the pre-salt, with the objective of maximising the economic and societal benefits for the 
country. Auctions were halted between 2008 and 2013 as the country established its new regulatory 
framework, during which time, it should be noted, the shale revolution led IOCs to invest elsewhere, 
other attractive deep-water prospects in Africa emerged, the oil price fell dramatically, and Brazil’s 
strong economic performance and political stability reversed. This new policy framework included 
enacting legislation (Federal Law No. 12.351/2010, Article 4) that ensured Petrobras was the only 
operator permitted in the pre-salt region and that the company must hold at least a 30 per cent 
minimum stake in all pre-salt projects. Just as with preceding governmental regimes, Petrobras was 
once again a vehicle for energy sovereignty. Protectionism of this nature, otherwise termed ‘resource 
nationalism’, is regarded as a significant political risk and has been shown to substantially destroy 
asset value (Click and Weiner, 2010).
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Petrobras’ exclusive rights were repealed by Congress in late-2016 (Bill 4567/16); however, other 
protectionist artefacts remain. This includes Pre-Sal Petróleo SA (PPSA), a state-owned company 
created to represent the government’s interests in the pre-salt, which holds a majority decision-making 
power in all pre-salt projects, despite not contributing any capital. Florêncio (2016) discusses how 
PPSA’s involvement in projects is a significant deterrent to IOC investment, and the author’s 
arguments will not be repeated here for reasons of brevity. We focus instead on local content, which 
was identified by interviewees as a leading concern for IOCs looking to invest in Brazilian petroleum.
The Brazilian model of local content focuses on domestically sourced materials, goods and services, 
and is imposed on oil companies through mandatory targets. Targets have been in place since 2003, 
and were increased considerably as part of the 2010 regulatory reforms and made part of the public 
tender. At the time of our fieldwork, these targets were of significant concern. Antonio Guimarães 
(IBP) described a set of 64 technical areas, each with a varying percentage of local content, all of 
which operators must comply with or incur financial penalties. “Certainly, that model has proven not 
to be effective. Lots of penalties, very few developments, and you can argue how much it has helped 
to develop the local industry. […] Local content cannot be a wide blanket to cover everything. […] 
It’s impossible. […] The penalties are so high that they end up making some of the projects 
unfeasible”. From IBP’s perspective, local content raised two concerns. Firstly, there was a lack of 
focus on supply sectors that present real opportunities for growth in the country. Tordo et al. (2011) 
emphasise the importance of focussing on a country’s existing strengths and areas with the highest 
potential for growth with any local content intervention. Secondly, the price inflation and delays 
associated with using Brazilian suppliers and/or the penalties resulting from not using Brazilian 
suppliers were significantly challenging the economics of projects. Industry experts estimate that local 
content has led to cost overruns as high as 50 per cent (Chauhan et al. , 2014), whereas fines for local 
content breaches often reach tens of millions of US$ (e.g. BG Group’s US$71 million fine in early 
2015). This was regarded as a serious risk to attracting IOC investment.
Nevertheless, the IOCs we spoke with were not opposed to local content per se, but rather the form of 
local content Brazil had chosen to enact. As an interviewee from one IOC explained: “local content is 
good because once you are in a country you need to have local support for your operations. There is a 
lot of value in developing the right local content” (Interviewee-C, Operator-2). The industry, along 
with IBP, has long been pushing for a new model of local content in Brazil. Whilst a reduction of the 
mandatory targets (and number of technical areas that must be addressed) was identified as being of 
grave importance, there was also a lot of support for the introduction of incentives to increase the 
participation of Brazilian suppliers (including the creation of joint ventures).
The need for a new approach to governance and regulation was apparent following the 13th 
concession bid round in Brazil in late 2015, when participation fell well short of expectations. Of the 
266 blocks on offer (182 onshore and 84 offshore), only 37 received bids (only two of which were 
offshore), and all major IOCs and NOCs (including Petrobras) withdrew from placing bids. Mr. 
Guimarães described this “appalling” outcome as a response from the industry to the unattractive 
environment for investment.
Changes to the local content model were enacted in late-2017 in preparation for the 14th concession 
bid round in September 2017 and two further auctions of pre-salt blocks in October 2017. This was 
aimed at reducing state involvement in the industry and boosting competition. Of the changes enacted, 
local content was removed as a criteria in the bid rounds, the dozens of technical areas were reduced 
to five broader sub-groups, and the targets for these sub-groups were set at a more-realistic 18% in the 
exploration phase and between 25 and 40% in the development phase (depending on the sub-group; 
ANP, 2017). Incentives were also introduced to increase the participation of small and medium-sized 
companies, reduce royalties for new frontier areas and mature basins of greater risk, and grant 
companies more freedom and greater flexibility in negotiating with suppliers (Powell, 2017).
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The pre-salt auctions - the first since October 2013, and the first opportunity for companies other than 
Petrobras to acquire blocks as the operator - were a success. Consortia of various NOCs and IOCs, 
including Shell, ExxonMobil, Equinor, BP and Total, were successful in acquiring six of the eight pre-
salt blocks available. Three of these successful bids included Petrobras; the company maintains its 
right to choose in advance which pre-salt blocks it wants to operate with a minimum 30% stake. 
The 14th concession round was also deemed a success, with ExxonMobil paying a record US$700m 
for one block (with joint partner Petrobras): a record in a South American country, and signalling the 
company’s return to Brazil after halting drilling in 2012 following disappointing results. The round 
raised a total of US$1.2 billion in signature bonuses, which ANP reported as the largest for a single 
bid round for the country (Davies, 2017). However, of the 287 blocks available, only 37 were 
acquired: the government had hoped to sell up to 40% (Alper and Gaier, 2017). The two pre-salt 
rounds raised a total of US$1.8 billion in signature bonuses, falling some way short of the US$2.3 
billion that it was hoped all eight blocks, if sold, would have raised (Schipani, 2017).
A 15th concession bid round (comprising onshore, offshore deepwater and offshore pre-salt blocks) 
was run in March 2018, which attracted a record breaking US$2.4 billion in signature bonuses, vastly 
exceeding the US$390 million the government had thought the round would raise (Wood Mackenzie, 
2018). It was described by ANP as having “surpassed all expectations” (Guthrie, 2018). Twenty-two 
offshore blocks were acquired of the forty-seven offered, which included acquisitions from Chevron, 
Repsol, Shell, BP and Equinor. ExxonMobil again broke the record for a single block, paying US$844 
million as part of a consortium with Petrobras and Qatar Petroleum (the latter’s first foray into the pre-
salt). Industry analysts attributed the round’s success to a combination of improved oil prices and the 
country’s recent regulatory improvements (Wood Mackenzie, 2018).
The Argentinian government, by comparison, has introduced several investor-friendly initiatives 
aimed at attracting IOC investment. In mid-2013, the ‘Investment Promotion Regime’ was 
established, which offered benefits to IOCs investing at least US$1 billion in Argentinian oil and gas 
projects, such as tax-free exportation of up to 20 per cent of the extracted hydrocarbons from the fifth 
year of a project. In October 2014, the ‘Hydrocarbons Reform Law’ was passed, which, along with 
updating and unifying the regulation, taxation, permitting and concession processes for Argentina 
petroleum, offered further incentives to boost exploration and development activities and attract 
foreign investment. The law applies a 25 per cent reduction in the royalty payments due from 
operators of unconventional oil and gas production in the ten years following the pilot-test period. 
Further, it lowers the limit at which IOCs can access the Investment Promotion Regime to US$250 
million.
Recent reforms are succeeding in attracting sizeable investments from the world’s leading IOCs. 
Following President Macri’s inauguration, the country’s long-held inhibitive currency controls (which 
included the requirement for exporters to convert foreign currency to Argentinian pesos and 
prohibited the expatriation of oil revenues) were removed, and import and export controls relaxed. 
However, heavy taxation (taxes currently account for 50-60 per cent of rents for IOCs), production 
and demand subsidies, and the use of price controls have so far endured. These were identified by 
interviewees from several operators and industry associations IAPG and GAPP as inhibitive to 
investment.
The Ministry of Mining and Energy (MEyM) - created by Macri as part of his Economic Cabinet - has 
been tasked with reducing subsidies, reorganising the industry’s regulatory framework and 
redesigning its governing policies. Two interviewees from MEyM acknowledged the push for market 
liberalisation and deregulation but stated that the transition would take several years. Such a move 
will face considerable opposition from the public, unions and provincial governments. Interviewees 
from operators similarly recognised the importance of deregulation to increasing activity in Vaca 
Muerta but that, given the preceding decade of heavy regulation, this will not be a quick process. The 
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deregulation of pricing in particular - which is often referred to as a major turning point for the scaling 
up of US shale (Accenture, 2014) - was a request of interviewees from three operators:
“No international oil company wants to be government dependent. […] The moment they 
deregulate and base their price system on an international price […] companies will come 
because they can somehow foresee what is going to happen and not […] fear that some 
subsidy paid to them will be eliminated. This will be tremendously important for this 
industry. And as long as this does not change I do not think that companies will strongly 
invest in Argentina” (Interviewee-D, Operator-3).
Another interviewee from an IOC echoed this statement by highlighting the disparity between the vast 
acreage that has been acquired by the industry’s leading names and the very modest activity to date. 
Since the drilling of the first well in the Vaca Muerta in late 2010, there were only 560 producing 
wells as of the end of 2015. The Eagle Ford shale play in the US, by comparison, saw over 16,000 
wells brought to production between 2008 and the end of 2015 (Gomes and Brandt, 2016). The 
interviewee stated that all operators are waiting on clear fiscal, regulatory and pricing frameworks to 
guide long-term investment decisions.
Some of the IOCs’ concerns were allayed in January 2017 as the government extended a price subsidy 
on natural gas, scheduled to end in 2017, through to 2020 and reduced the sector’s labour costs and 
contract inflexibility in exchange for increased investment. Several IOCs and YPF duly pledged to 
invest a combined initial US$5 billion in early-2017, with the goal of increasing this to US$15 billion 
a year by 2018 (Mander, 2017).
Finally, it should be noted that Argentina has a problem not only with instability when it comes to 
natural resources policy, but also its credibility. In 2011, tax breaks amounting to US$461 million 
were offered to oil and mining companies but were later withdrawn and the companies ordered to 
repatriate the export revenue from the previous year and convert it to Argentine pesos (Mares, 2013a). 
When Repsol-YPF resisted, the government halted the company’s exports until it paid the export debt. 
Repsol-YPF would later claim this resulted in eight potential partners in Argentinian shale terminating 
their interest (Mares, 2013b).
Summary
Each interviewee was asked to list the main challenges and strengths that the Brazilian pre-
salt or Argentinian shale reserves present.  By way of summarising this dataset, these are 
presented in Table 2 in the form of a SWOT analysis.
Table 2: SWOT Analysis of Argentinian shale and Brazilian pre-salt
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Argentinian Shale Brazilian Pre-salt
Strengths Technical:
• Quality and size of 
reserves
• Surplus infrastructure 
in Neuquén
• Favourable production 
conditions
• Availability of natural 
resources (e.g. water)




• Governmental relations 
and support
• Existing legal 
framework
• Domestic demand
• Community acceptance 
and low population
• Availability of human 
resources
• Labour unions 
(particularly training of 
HR)
• Strong domestic service 
sector
Technical:
• Quality and size of 
reserves
• Production rates
• Reliability and well 
construction
• Cost base (US$6-7 
lifting cost/bbl)
• Economies of scale
• Existing infrastructure
Non-technical:
• Strong domestic service 
sector





• Low productivity 
(although improving)
Non-technical:
• Control of labour 
unions




• Modest domestic 
knowledge and 
expertise bases




• Customs and 
importation (slow and 
costly)
Technical:
• Engineering challenges 








• Fiscal regime (Repetro)
• Tax regime (inc. state 




• No specific 
environmental 
regulation for pre-salt
Opportunities • Domestic energy self-
sufficiency
• Utilise industry’s spare 
capacity
• Develop sand 
production to support 
hydraulic fracturing
• Develop high-tech 
domestic service sector
• Utilise associated gas 
(historically regarded 
as a problem)
Threats • Community 
engagement
• Public acceptance 
(fracking)
• Governance and 
regulation uncertainties
• Future water supply
• Future infrastructure 
deficit
• Global oil price
• Gas may be bottleneck 
for oil production
• Gas management and 
treatment




Argentinian Shale Brazilian Pre-salt
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Both Argentinian shale and Brazilian pre-salt offer challenges to the IOCs. In Brazil, considerable 
investment in new technologies is needed to deliver pre-salt oil at a breakeven that makes it 
economically viable. In Argentina, business model innovation is required to better suit the nature of 
the shale resources and achieve scale economies. Interviewees in Brazil and Argentina clearly 
recognise the sizeable task at hand in delivering this. However, these are consistently not the type of 
challenges that IOCs list as their primary concerns. Rather, it is the non-technical risks and 
uncertainties that the respective investment climates present that are considered most pressing. Whilst 
IOCs are both familiar with, and adept at, managing such concerns, in a cost conscious and capital 
constrained industry the extent to which these act as a disincentive to investment is heightened.
There are two constraints in both case studies in this regard. The first is the level of intervention by 
the government. For a long time, Brazil believed that the pre-salt was such a geologically-attractive 
prospect that IOCs would accept any and all requirements placed on them. They have since come to 
realise this is not the case, and by alleviating some of the interventionism imposed of oil companies 
they have had some success in securing investment. The results of the 15th concession round 
highlight the need for an attractive fiscal regime and regulatory framework in order to secure large-
scale funding given the industry’s current investment climate.
The second non-technical constraint is the level of uncertainty. This is perhaps best illustrated by the 
pricing subsidies offered by the Argentinian government, which, as discussed above, have been 
renewed until the end of 2020. In announcing the agreement, President Macri stated “we have to give 
guarantees and provide certainty in order to attract investment” (Misculin, 2017). Whilst this has been 
met with an increase in investment, it only addresses the problem of uncertainty in the short-term. The 
pricing subsidies were brought up by several interviewees, none of whom called for the subsidy to be 
renewed, but who wanted an end to the uncertainty around the subsidy. The Brazilian government also 
recognises that mitigating uncertainty is a challenge: “the most unattractive issue as of today is the 
unpredictability” (João Vicente de Carvalho Vieira, MME). Brazil’s recent success is somewhat 
clouded by a general election approaching that could again change the political landscape and revive 
resource nationalism. One leading candidate, Ciro Ferreira Gomes, has pledged to expropriate the oil 
fields from recent auctions, whilst the spectre of contract term changes and fewer auctions from a 
change of leadership also looms (Guthrie, 2018).
The recent history of both countries and their changing motivations for their respective oil and gas 
industries and NOCs demonstrates large policy swings. The IOCs have had to operate under constant 
policy uncertainty. Looking ahead, in this new political economy, mitigating policy and regulatory 
uncertainty is paramount to securing the investment needed to turn the respective resources into 
proven reserves and output.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Under the current environment of a ‘lower for longer’ oil price, national and international oil 
companies are operating under a position of constrained capital. At the same time, with access to 
‘easy oil’ projects for IOCs all but exhausted, these companies are turning to prospects that offer 
considerable new technical risks. However, despite the technical challenges the IOCs face, it is the 
non-technical risks and uncertainties that are more pressing for these companies and, we conclude, are 
the greater inhibitors to investment.
Whilst both governments have instilled changes to their respective investment environments, the 
Brazilian pre-salt and Argentinian shale are yet to secure the levels of investment needed to secure the 
large-scale development of these resources. In Brazil, the recent signs are positive but there is a need 
for stability in the coming years in order to deliver on the pre-salt’s potential. In Argentina, whilst the 
list of IOCs present in the shale is impressive, investment and activity in the Vaca Muerta has been 
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modest to date. It is clear that today - under a low oil price and constrained capital environment - 
attractive geology is not enough to secure large-scale investment from IOCs. Clearly there is a bargain 
to be struck between the requirements of the IOCs and the aims of the resource-holding states, but 
national governments must work to mitigate non-technical risks, which, we have shown, take the form 
of both interventionism and uncertainty. A regulatory framework and fiscal regime that are 
predictable, transparent and stable is critical to realising the potential of these resources and securing 
the investment from IOCs required to develop them for the enrichment of wider society.
Finally, to the issue of whether Argentinian shale and Brazilian pre-salt are currently competing for 
capital as two of the industry’s leading global prospects - and, by extension, whether deep-water and 
tight oil and gas projects compete. With capital constrained, they compete within each company, but 
not in a manner that one could substitute for the other. Deep-water and tight oil and gas offer different 
strengths and satisfy different components of an IOC’s portfolio. Deep-water is high investment and 
inflexible but this is offset by its long-term gains and high oil content. Shale is flexible, offering a 
freedom to operators to increase or decrease production in response to the market, and also offers 
returns within months, rather than years. In this regard, they complement one another. However, 
national governments must be cognisant that a competition does exist between similar resources (e.g. 
between pre-salt and African deep-water). Regardless of whether investment in oil and gas is 
considered a basis for sustainable economic development, the reality is that global competition for 
investment from IOCs is high in the current capital constrained world, and this competition comes 
from countries with different contractual mechanisms, political risks and regulatory frameworks. This 
again underlines the significance of non-technical risks and the need for national governments to 
mitigate these should they wish to secure such investment. In sum, the current constraints facing the 
IOCs are serving to reduce the ability of the national governments and their NOCs to dictate the terms 
of entry for foreign investors.  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